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SPINNING OUT OF CONTROL: THE SCANDAL MACHINE
LA NJ. DAVIS*
"Where there is a will to condemn, there is evidence."1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clinton White House has been accused of mastering the art
of "spinning." Howard Kurtz, in his best-selling 1998 book Spin Cycle,
attached a clearly pejorative connotation to this term when he de-
scribed Clinton White House press operatives who "launder the
news... scrub it of dark scandal stains, remove unsightly splotches of
controversy . . . and present it to the country crisp and sparkling
white. The underlying garment was the same, but it was often un-
recognizable."2 But there is another kind of spinning, which Kurtz
gave less attention to in his book. This is the type at times employed
by certain members of the White House scandal press corps: spinning
that relies on unnamed and often unreliable sources, suggestive writ-
ing, sloppy editing, and shrill headlines to infer political wrongdoing
where there are often little or no facts to substantiate it.
Such journalistic spinning, although it sometimes claims to be
consistent with objective, investigative reporting, is in fact driven by a
decidedly subjective, judgmental point of view-a pervasive cynicism
about politics and politicians that exists among the very same scandal
press corps. This spin is based on the presumption of guilt of any
political figure accused of scandal, thus requiring the target to estab-
lish affirmatively his or her innocence or, even more difficult, to prove
the negative.
The scandal press feeds off of leaking politicians (who often have
partisan motives), unaccountable prosecutors, FBI and congressional
investigators, and individuals paid by wealthy political extremists.
One example of the latter is ultra-right-wing billionaire Richard Mel-
lon Scaife, who, as now has been disputably documented, spent mil-
* Partner, Patton Boggs LLP. B.A., Yale College; LL.B., Yale Law School. Former
Special Counsel to President Clinton, 1996-98.
1. JUNG CHANG, WILD SwANs: THREE DAUGHTERS OF CHINA 323 (1991).
2. HowARD KURTZ, SPIN CYCLE: INSIDE THE CLINTON PROPAGANDA MACHINE xix-xx
(1998).
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lions funding a covert industry of scandal mongers trying to destroy
President Clinton.
Here is how the scandal machine works:
-Rather than relying on concrete, provable, well-
researched, factual evidence, the press publishes allegations
of wrongdoing against an administration (Democratic or Re-
publican), too often relying on innuendo and inferences
from facts that are not necessarily connected to one another.
-Opposition congressional politicians react to the pub-
lished reports by launching investigations and hearings,
often justifying the allocation of time and money on the
mere fact that these public reports exist.
-Parallel criminal investigations and prosecutions may re-
sult, often via an independent counsel whose appointment
has been demanded by congressional leaders, editorial writ-
ers, and ethics "spokespersons" because of the published al-
legations and congressional investigations.
-More stories are published after leaks from congressional
investigators and prosecutors, resulting in more hearings,
more calls for independent counsel, and more investiga-
tions, which result in more news articles, and so on-back
and forth and back again. It all feeds on itself.
-And inevitably: editorial writers, talking heads, ethics
"spokespersons," and opposition party politicians decry the
"scandals" of the administration, its "sleaze," and its "lack of
ethics," all citing in seeming unison to the stories, hearings,
and independent counsel investigations.
The result: Things have gotten out of control. The operation of the scan-
dal machine itself becomes evidence of guilt. All perspective and truth itself are
the ultimate victims.
This is scary stuff. Anyone who does not find it scary is infected
with a terminal case of "it-cannot-happen-to-me-itis." It is reminiscent
of the worst of the anti-communist investigatory abuses of the 1940s
and 1950s.
Those unlucky enough to be the objects of the machine's atten-
tion end up with huge legal bills-in the case of President and Mrs.
Clinton, bills totaling millions of dollars-often without any charges
ever being brought, much less an indictment or a conviction. Most
victims of the machine never get their day in court, but they do get
3. See JOE CONASON & GENE LYONS, THE HUNTING OF THE PRESIDENT: THE TEN-YEAR
CAMPAIGN TO DESTROY BILL AND HILLARY CLINTON passim (2000) (discussing Scaife's in-
volvement in and funding of conservative causes that consistently attempted to frustrate
Bill Clinton's political career).
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their days in the glare of screaming headlines, national television
broadcasts, and the congressional committees' televised accusations
and innuendo. Thus, the constitutionally protected presumption of
innocence has been reversed and basic principles of due process
abandoned. Once accused, public officials are forced, and in fact ex-
pected, to prove the negative. The critical distinction between evi-
dence and fact versus innuendo and allegation has been lost.
In the final analysis, the scandal machine fundamentally threat-
ens the effective functioning of American democracy, core values of
fairness and due process, and the presumption of innocence. Public-
spirited people of real quality and dedication are being discouraged
from engaging in politics and public service. Voter turnout and politi-
cal participation continue to decline. And the breakdown of the basic
respect that the American people have for their government and a
free press-a trust that arguably is at the heart of our constitutional
form of government-is accelerating.
Of course, political scandal has been part of the American politi-
cal fabric since the dawn of the Republic. The scandal machine has
been with us a long time. But today's version is different and more
dangerous to our democracy because of a number of new develop-
ments in the aftermath of Watergate. Allow me to elaborate.
II. ONE OLD-AND FIvE NEW-ELEMENTS DRIVING THE MACHINE
One element of the machine that is not new is the misuse of con-
gressional investigatory powers for partisan purposes. We have wit-
nessed this phenomenon repeatedly throughout American history.
The most notorious example in modern times is the parallel anti-com-
munism investigations conducted by the House Un-American Activi-
ties Committee and Senator Joseph McCarthy, beginning shortly after
the Second World War.
In the 1980s, it was a Democrat-controlled Congress that harassed
the Reagan and Bush administrations. Weapons of choice for the
Democrats included endless partisan hearings and investigations of
cabinet, sub-cabinet, and Supreme Court nominees. The result was
often the appointment of an independent counsel, converting what
began as a political attack into a criminal prosecution. The assault on
Raymond Donovan, President Reagan's Labor Secretary, described
below, is just one of the more egregious examples.4
4. See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (discussing the independent counsel
investigation of Donovan).
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By 1997, it was the Republicans' turn-payback time, they openly
admitted.5 What began as the campaign finance hearings quickly de-
generated into entirely partisan, one-sided exercises in both the
House and the Senate, designed to embarrass the Clinton administra-
tion, weaken the Democratic Party, help retain control of Congress in
1998, and win the White House in 2000. There was little pretense
about the need for balanced fact-finding. Few people believed that
the investigations were ever intended to uncover campaign finance
abuses in both parties in order to build support for meaningful reform.
In the last several decades, five new elements have been intro-
duced into the scandal machine process-most of them in the after-
math of, and heavily influenced by, Watergate. Individually and
collectively, their effect has been to magnify significantly the negative
impacts of today's machine. The new elements are changes in jour-
nalism, telecommunications technologies, ethical standards and struc-
tures, the law, and public attitudes towards government and
politicians.
A. The Journalistic World After Watergate
There have been four major post-Watergate changes in journal-
ism that have magnified the negative impacts of the scandal machine.
First is the media's overindulgence in pursuing agenda-based investi-
gative reporting. Second is the more frequent use of an interpretive
"connect-the-dots" style ofjournalism. Third is the use of misinforma-
tion and false information by editorial boards and op-ed writers. And
fourth is the proliferation of using talking heads, who often give
credence to unsubstantiated allegations or news stories.
1. InvestigativeJournalism.-The impact of the Watergate-style in-
vestigative journalism practiced by Washington Post reporters Bob
Woodward and Carl Bernstein has been of critical significance to
changes in media coverage. Since the Post's Watergate success, news
5. As House Republican Bob Barr stated in early 1998, " ' Most targets of independent
counsels prior to the Clinton administration were Republicans .... Now it's the Demo-
crats' turn.'" Lawrence M. O'Rourke, Many Lawmakers Targeting Independent Counsel Law,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 16, 1998, at A17 (quoting Rep. Bob Barr). Congressman Henry
Hyde expressed similar sentiments. See Sixty-Seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth
Circuit, The Independent Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, 54 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1515, 1583 (1997) (statement of Rep. HenryJ. Hyde, Chairman, House judici-
ary Committee) ("When the Reagan Administration and the Bush Administration were in
the White House, why, there was great Democratic support for independent counsels.
Now that the shoe is on the other foot, the Republicans are looking more kindly at this
institution.").
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organizations have developed investigative agendas and have funded
teams of reporters to pursue them. The result is often the creation of
news stories that drive events and generate further reporting and in-
vestigations by other journalists.
Investigative journalists obviously play an important role in our
society. Government wrongdoing is not likely to be discovered easily.
As Woodward and Bernstein and the Post demonstrated, journalists
often have to rely on both circumstantial evidence and "connect-the-
dots" inferences6 to suggest that one event caused another event to
happen, and on unnamed sources to ferret out the truth from resis-
tant government officials. Mistakes inevitably will be made in this pro-
cess, and perhaps innocent people will be unintentionally smeared.
But many would argue that this is occasionally a price worth paying in
order to expose official wrongdoing.
It is also true, however, that since Watergate, increasing numbers
of reporters and news organizations have forgotten the dangers and
limitations of investigative reporting. The danger is not just the obvi-
ous overreliance on anonymous sources; the more subtle danger is
inherent in the investigative process itself. Once a news organization
or reporter chooses a subject area to investigate, it becomes difficult
to avoid trying to prove a predisposed hypothesis. The attempt to
prove such a hypothesis is carried out, sometimes unconsciously,
through choices in researching, writing, editing, and headline writing,
and by omitting or downplaying evidence that tends to undermine the
hypothesis.
This danger of predisposition affecting the outcome of investiga-
tive journalism can be seen in key instances during the coverage of the
campaign finance issue. Even the icon of investigative journalism,
Bob Woodward, fell prey to this danger. On February 13, 1997, in a
page-one lead story, Woodward (and Post reporter Brian Duffy) de-
scribed a Chinese government "plan[ ]" to direct foreign contribu-
tions to the Democratic National Committee before the 1996
presidential campaign. But belying the dramatic headline and
lengthy text was the sparse evidence and lack of substance of the ac-
tual story. Indeed, it took a close reading of the story to realize that
there was no evidence at all that such a plan had ever been implemented; that
6. See infta Part II.A.2 (discussing how reporters use "connect-the-dots" inferences to
create news stories).
7. Bob Woodward & Brian Duffy, Chinese Embassy Role in Contributions Probed; Planning
of Foreign Donations to DNC Indicated, WASH. PosT, Feb. 13, 1997, at Al.
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is, the "plan," if it ever existed, never got past the discussion stage."
And even now, almost three years later, no further evidence of the
plan has ever been substantiated-by the Post, a congressional com-
mittee, or in a court of law.
2. Connecting the Dots.-A related journalistic by-product of
Watergate is the movement from objective reporting towards what Ed-
win R. Bayley, in his definitive study of press coverage of Senator Jo-
seph McCarthy, referred to as "interpretive" journalism-journalism
that goes beyond straight fact reporting and graduates to the use of
techniques intended to convey inferences and to cause the reader to
make subjective interpretations of those inferences.' The phrase that
gained common usage during my year as a "scandal spokesman" in
the White House in 1997 was "connect-the-dots" journalism. This
phrase referred to the reporting of apparent facts (dots) that are ar-
ranged, juxtaposed, and edited in such a way as to lead a reader to
connect them-to infer a cause-and-effect (or some other) relation-
ship-even though there is no direct evidence reported to support
the connections. The Latin expression for such fallacious dot-con-
necting might be "post hoc ergo propter hoc-literally translated, "after
this, therefore, because of this." A more colloquial way of putting it is:
"First, the rooster crows. Then the sun rises. Therefore, the rooster's
crow causes the sun to rise."
We see this syllogistic fallacy at work again and again in the jour-
nalism practiced during the intensive reporting of alleged Democratic
campaign finance abuses in the 1996 presidential campaign. One
event is reported (for example, a report of a Democratic campaign
contribution), a Clinton White House policy decision then follows,
and ergo, through suggestive phrases and juxtapositions, the reader is
influenced to conclude that the contribution caused the policy deci-
sion. This may occur when there is no direct evidence supporting the
claim and even when contrary evidence is offered.
I have discussed this connect-the-dots technique with many re-
porters who were in the thick of the scandal machine, and I was sur-
prised at how many agreed that this was a serious issue, although most
would point to others as being more guilty than themselves. Tim Ber-
8. See id. (alleging that contributions were planned and that efforts to implement a
plan were suspected, but never fully substantiated).
9. EDWIN R. BAYLEY, JoE MCCARTHY AND THE PRss 85-87 (1981) (explaining that Sena-
tor McCarthy took advantage of the media's long-standing policy of reporting only facts,
unembellished by any opinion or judgment, and that the backlash from this policy
prompted editors to allow journalists to begin interpreting the facts that they reported).
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ger, a reporter who wrote for Legal Times when I was at the White
House, provided me with a critical way of understanding the problem,
noting the failure of reporters to differentiate between "correlation"
and "causation." An example of correlational facts would be: a liberal
Democrat gives money to a liberal Democratic congressman and the
congressman later votes for a liberal Democratic program. One can
say that the contribution did not "cause" the vote, but rather, that
there is a philosophical correlation between the liberalism of the con-
tributor, the liberalism of the congressman, and the congressman's
support for the liberal program. In the coverage of the campaign fi-
nance and Monica Lewinsky stories, reporters almost never suggested
an innocent correlation between facts, or even the possibility that
there might be such a correlation. Instead, the press usually relied on
innuendo that virtually demanded a cause-and-effect relationship, and
thus, an inference of wrongdoing.
A less subtle and more dangerous version of connect-the-dots
journalism occurs when at least some of the factual dots are not pub-
licly verifiable, but, instead are based on anonymous and unreliable
sources. In such an instance, the possibility for distortion is com-
pounded; not only are the suggested inferences of a causal relation-
ship possibly unfounded, but the asserted facts may also turn out to be
wrong. As we now know, this is what occurred in the early reporting
of the Monica Lewinsky story. Such leading news operations as the
Wall Street Journal and the Dallas Morning News were forced to retract
stories because they had been based on unidentified second- or third-
hand sources that turned out to be unreliable."
3. Editorials and Op-ed Writers .- Of course, editorials and col-
umns are understood to be opinions, and are therefore granted more
slack by the reader. But as will be seen, too often editorialists and
columnists base their opinions on misinformation or downright false
information. During my year at the White House, I had many conver-
sations with editorial page editors and columnists in which I pointed
10. See Glenn R. Simpson & Phil Kuntz, Starr Files Motion to Compel Secret Service to Testify
in Clinton Case, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1998, at A24 (noting the retraction of a Journal story
that inaccurately characterized a White House employee's grand jury testimony); Informa-
tion for Story Inaccurate, Source Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 27, 1998, at IA (acknowl-
edging the inaccuracy of a source that caused the Dallas Morning News to report that a
Secret Service agent was prepared to testify that "he saw President Clinton and Monica
Lewinsky in a compromising situation"); see also BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, WARP
SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF MIXED MEDIA 20-21 (1999) (discussing the retracted Wall
Street Journal and Dallas Morning News stories and noting that the press has a tendency to
rely on unsubstantiated or secondhand information).
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out editorials and articles containing factual inaccuracies that led to
unsupported conclusions. The rejoinder would often be that the in-
formation referenced in such articles had been derived from pub-
lished reports-usually from the editor's or columnist's own
newspaper. It was as if the fact of publication itself justified the citation,
regardless of accuracy. In other words, I found myself fighting not only
unreasonable inferences from disconnected facts, but unreasonable
inferences from nonfacts.
An example: On April 3, 1997, the New York Times editorialized
that the Independent Counsel should investigate a possible hush
money conspiracy because former White House Chief of Staff Thomas
F. "Mack" McLarty had "led" an effort by many friends of the Presi-
dent to "find profitable employment" for Webster Hubbell after his
resignation from the Justice Department in March 1994.11 The edito-
rial also referred to McLarty "and his crew" in the context of such a
conspiracy.12 But the Times had misstated the facts-contrary to its
own published reports. McLarty had not "led" anyone to do anything.
All he did, as was reported in the Times the day before, was make
phone calls on behalf of Hubbell.13 Moreover, while the Times hy-
pothesized about a possible hush money conspiracy, it could cite no
factual evidence to demonstrate that anyone had chosen to help Hub-
bell find employment, or that there was anything that Hubbell actually
knew that needed to be hushed up. In short, nonfacts were being used to
support unreasonable inferences.14
4. Talking Heads and the Talk Shows.-The same phenomena-
opinions on the latest scandal stories based on nonfacts or misinfor-
mation-occurred on the daily and weekly fare of television news
panel discussions. This was not coincidental because many of the
same people writing editorials and columns were the featured talking
heads. This too makes for a different journalistic landscape than that
of thirty years ago. Today we have increasing numbers of journalists
who routinely cross the line and become television celebrities and
sometimes newsmakers. As will be seen, these electronic journalists,
week after week, quote from each other, and sometimes from their
own news reporting and op-ed columns. The effect is to generate ad-
ditional reporting that repeats the same unsubstantiated allegations.
11. Editorial, Welfare for Webster Hubbell, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1997, at A20.
12. Id.
13. Jeff Gerth, White House Aides Helped Job Hunt of Clinton Friend, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
1997, at Al (discussing McLarty's role in finding employment for Hubbell).
14. The end result was that Kenneth Starr never had any evidence to even propose an
indictment based on the Times' speculative, innuendo-based theory.
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B. The Telecommunications Revolution
It is hard to overstate how the revolution in telecommunications
technology over the last decade-cable and satellite television,
around-the-clock news networks, and especially, the Internet-af-
fected the intensity of the scandal machine. Unfounded accusations
are now broadcast around the globe literally in seconds, with reputa-
tions perhaps irreparably damaged before the truth can even be ut-
tered, let alone prevail.
The Internet is an important element in the spreading of often
extreme and sometimes false charges via the establishment press. In
an early, not-so-tongue-in-cheek White House document, this commu-
nications network was likened to a "Communication Stream of Con-
spiracy Commerce" that begins with totally raw materials and ends up
as a manufactured product in the marketplace. 5
The scenario usually begins with false or shaky charges being cir-
culated on websites maintained by extremist fringe groups or far-out
conspiracy theorists.' 6 The charges are then repeated by ultra-con-
servative talk show hosts or tabloid newspapers around this country or
in England, further exposed publicly by Republican congressional
representatives, reported in conservative Republican press stalwarts
such as the Washington Times and the New York Post, and finally, re-
ported in the mainstream media.17 Then back they go around the
world via the Internet.
Thus, while the release of the White House document in early
January 1997 describing this "Communication Stream of Conspiracy
Commerce" phenomenon was greeted with widespread ridicule in the
press, subsequent revelations and reporting have repeatedly demon-
strated the validity of the document's hypothesis.
Another technological development that exacerbates the nega-
tive impact of the scandal machine is the ready availability of news
databases. The most popular and well known is called Nexis. Nexis
and similar news databases permit easy access to all previously pub-
lished articles about a particular subject matter using "keyword"
15. See Clinton: WH Counsel's Office Issues Media Report, HOTLINE (American Political Net-
work, Inc.), Jan. 9, 1997 (explaining the rationale behind a White House document that
suggested that right-wing groups deliberately manipulate the media through use of the
Internet in an attempt to place misleading or false information into mainstream news
publications).
16. See id. (explaining that the 1997 White House document charged that "well-fi-
nanced 'right wing' groups 'employ an usual strategy to get fringe stories published in the
mainstream media'").
17. See id. (describing in detail the steps of this process).
2001]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
search capability. For example, if you want to find all news articles
prior to 1996 that mentioned the phrase "campaign finance investiga-
tions," you log on to the Nexis database from your computer and
search for newspapers and magazines in which this phrase appeared
prior to the given date. Almost instantaneously, all such stories are
listed chronologically and made available for print-out with the click
of the computer mouse.
But such a capability also means that if there is an early uncor-
rected factual mistake it will likely appear over and over again as each
successive journalist finds it in the Nexis database and relies on it for
future reporting. Even if there is a retraction, it may not be picked up
or even noticed in subsequent Nexis searches. As Boston Globe colum-
nist Tom Oliphant puts it: "Given the modern computer's vast storage
and retrieval capabilities, a virus quickly spreads through the press,
each outbreak becoming the 'factual' basis for the next, a process that
continues to this day."i"
C. The Ethics Apparatus and the Appearances Culture
Also feeding the scandal machine frenzy is the growth of what
Suzanne Garment, in her seminal book on political scandal, described
as the "ethics apparat."19 A direct result of Watergate and its after-
math, this ethics apparatus is comprised of spokespersons, consul-
tants, and lawyers for various public interest and nonprofit groups
who are always available with quotes on what "appears" to be "inappro-
priate," "unsuitable," or "unethical"-words with definitions that vary
according to the eye of the beholder.
Integral to this apparatus, of course, is the post-Watergate scandal
press corps. Indeed, the work of many of these journalists evidences a
similar and disturbing sanctimony toward politics and politicians. As
they write their scandal machine stories, members of the scandal press
corps often set the bar to measure "appropriateness" unrealistically
high-so high that perhaps no politician (and in reality no journalist)
could possibly meet it. As Joseph Alsop once commented:
I am horrified by what has happened to our business ....
Independence, honest reporting, hard work, are the quali-
ties that I value in newspapers. I do not value self-dramatiza-
tion, self-righteousness, and self-appointment to be the
moral censors of the nation .... All these rules seem to me
18. Thomas Oliphant, Another Victim Is Caught in the Scandal Machine, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 16, 1997, at A17.
19. SUZANNE GARMENT, SCANDAL: THE CULTURE OF MISTRUST IN AMERICAN POLITICS 83
(1991).
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to have been forgotten in the last years, and I am persuaded
that our business will pay a heavy bill for this forgetfulness in
the years to come.20
This comment is just as applicable to the campaign finance and White
House intern stories as it was to Watergate.
The world of the ethics apparatus is almost entirely subjective. It
is a world where appearances and process are more important than
reality and substance. It is the antithesis of a system of objectively de-
fined rules that clearly differentiate what is legal from what is illegal-
a system otherwise known as the rule of law. In contrast to the rule of
law, the rule of appearances depends entirely on individual percep-
tion. As such, no one can be sure at any given moment whether one is
short of the line or over the line.
One of the most egregious examples of the subjectivity of the eth-
ics apparatus is the "Center for Public Integrity." This self-anointed
pronouncer of ethical judgments (the very name of the organization
says it all on the issue of self-righteousness) is often the first "go to"
organization when a journalist is looking for a judgmental quote on
any subject. For example, in December 1998, Charles Lewis, the "Di-
rector" of the Center, was asked to comment on the acquittal of for-
mer Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy after a $17 million
investigation and a thirty-count indictment by Independent Counsel
Donald Smaltz was dismissed by ajury without Espy even having to put
on a defense. Smaltz, in a pronouncement that should become the
all-time emblem of a scary, near-fascist attitude of an independent
counsel who is completely out of control, claimed that there is an im-
portant public purpose to a public official being indicted, even if he is
acquitted. "'The actual indictment of a public official may in fact be
as great a deterrent as a conviction of that official,"' Smaltz said, in-
credibly.21 Smaltz further stated that "'the appearance of impropriety
can be as damning as bribery is to public confidence,"' and thus, even
unsuccessful prosecutions are necessary to insure that the "'ends of
justice"' are served. 22
Charles Lewis defended Smaltz's prosecution of Espy's accept-
ance of gifts based on-you guessed it-bad appearances. He argued
that there is no way to draw the line between small gifts and big gifts,
thoroughly ignoring the fact that Espy had been prosecuted for com-
20. BAYLEY, supra note 9, at 165 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Joseph Alsop).
21. Jeffrey Rosen, Stop, in theName oftheLaw, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998, at D19 (quoting
Donald Smaltz).
22. Id,
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mitting a crime, not for offending Lewis's easily offended subjective
sensibilities, and had been acquitted. Fortunately for our legal system,
much less our constitutional protections, the Espy jury applied the ob-
jective rule of law.
Lewis and others in the ethics apparatus have become preoccu-
pied with appearances over substance, hoping to assure high stan-
dards for public officials. This preoccupation may, in fact, produce
the opposite result. As attorneys Peter Morgan and Glenn Reynolds
wrote in their book, The Appearance of Impropriety, "We live, in short, in
an Age of Appearances," 2 3 and "[i] t is, ultimately .... a story of the
substitution of appearances for substance, of technicalities for judg-
ment, of opportunism for self-discipline."24 Morgan and Reynolds
aptly summarize the problem of the ethics apparat and the appear-
ance culture, noting that "[a] lthough the post-Watergate explosion of
ethics rules has produced enormous benefits for parts of society-
chiefly journalists, interest groups, ethics consultants, and political op-
eratives-it has not produced confidence. In fact, faith in govern-
ment and corporate America has probably never been lower." 25
D. The Independent Counsel Act
We have seen that the use of the appearance of impropriety as a
standard for judging politicians can be slippery and subjective, and
that when combined with the power of the Independent Counsel
Act,26 before its merciful expiration in 1999,27 it can be profoundly
dangerous to our democratic system of justice. But even without the
misuse of this statute by a prosecutor who has lost all perspective and
reasonable discretion, such as Donald Smaltz, the Act became proba-
bly the most insidious element of the post-Watergate scandal machine;
it gave the machine its most terrible, terrifying, and potentially de-
structive power. This is because the Independent Counsel Act, as it
evolved in the 1980s and 1990s, became the instrument of choice in
the political arena to serve partisan purposes. The Act was used by
23. PETER W. MORGAN & GLENN H. REYNOLDS, THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY: How
THE ETHICS WARS HAvE UNDERMINED AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND SOCIETY 2
(1997).
24. Id. at 6.
25. Id. at 1.
26. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
27. The Independent Counsel Act lapsed on June 30, 1999, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 599, which states that the Act "shall cease to be effective five years after the date of the
enactment of the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994." 28 U.S.C. § 599
(1994); see also Roberto Suro, As Special Counsel Law Expires, Power Will Shift to Reno, WASH.
POST, June 30, 1999, at A6 (discussing the lapse of the Independent Counsel Act).
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both parties-first, by the Democrats, and then, in the Clinton years,
by the Republicans. The view of the Act from the start depended very
much on whose political ox was being gored.
Ironically, it was the Democrats who in the 1970s and 1980s
pushed for a broad Independent Counsel Act and then used congres-
sional committees to generate pressure to appoint independent coun-
sels to investigate Reagan and Bush administration officials. 28
Through the 1980s, it was the Republicans who decried the overuse
and politicization of the Act. During Independent Counsel Lawrence
Walsh's six-year Iran-Contra investigation and prosecutions, it was the
Republicans who decried the "'criminalization of political differ-
ences'"29 and who complained about the unlimited budget and lack
of political accountability of an independent counsel.3" The decisions
by Walsh to indict Oliver North for accepting an illegal gratuity in the
form of a home-security system"1 and to indict former Defense Secre-
tary Caspar Weinberger just days before the 1992 election3 2 should
have been denounced by Democrats, but were not.33
When the statute was up for renewal in 1994, the Justice Depart-
ment requested broader authority for the attorney general to initiate
an investigation under the Independent Counsel Act.3 4 (With memo-
ries of Lawrence Walsh in mind, most Republicans opposed that re-
quest.) At the time, there were two situations under the Act that
triggered an investigation: first, an allegation of criminal conduct
against a "covered person" (such as the president, vice president, or a
cabinet official); or second, an actual "personal, financial, or political
28. As Thomas Mann, a political scientist at the Brookings Institution, stated: "'When a
Republican was in the White House, Democrats were champions of the independent coun-
sel law and quick to demand its use at the slightest provocation ... .'" O'Rourke, supra
note 5, at A17 (quoting Thomas Mann); see also S. REP. No. 103-101, at 13-14 (1993), re-
printed in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 757-59 (describing the "major actions" brought pursuant
to the independent counsel law between the years of 1978 and 1992).
29. Peter M. Shane, Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors: Legal Accountability and the Sepa-
ration of Powers, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 361, 369 (1993).
30. See id. at 369 n.29 (noting public criticisms of Walsh by Reagan administration
officials).
31. See LAWRENCE E. WALSH, IRAN-CoNrTRA: THE FINAL REPORT 106 (1994) (discussing
the indictment of North).
32. See id. at 405 (discussing the indictment of Secretary Weinberger).
33. This is not to say that Judge Walsh did not do a creditable job prosecuting those
involved in Iran-Contra, but rather that in these instances he showed poor judgment and
excessive prosecutorial zeal that hurt his standing and politicized his efforts.
34. See S. REP. No. 103-100, at 20 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 764 ("The
Justice] Department contends that it should have the authority to invoke the independent
counsel process to investigate any subject matter raising conflict of interest concerns, with-
out having to name specific individuals as targets.").
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conflict-of-interest" between the Justice Department and a particular
"noncovered" person against whom an allegation of criminal conduct
had been made. 5 The Justice Department wanted to add another
basis for appointing an independent counsel-when investigating a
particular "subject matter" (not just a particular "person") would cre-
ate a conflict of interest.36 Congress, however, rejected the Depart-
ment's proposal to include the "subject matter" language.3 7 The final
congressional committee report stated that adding such new language
would have given the attorney general too much discretion.3 ' The
report also noted that an actual conflict of interest, and not just an
appearance of conflict, with an identified person was required before
an independent counsel could be appointed. 9
After the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, it was role-
reversal and payback time. Now it was the congressional Republicans
who, in the context of allegations of Democratic campaign finance
abuses, suddenly saw wisdom in the Independent Counsel Act and de-
sirability in broadening, not narrowing, its interpretation and applica-
tion. The fact that they had opposed these proposals just three years
before did not seem to bother them. Ironically, congressional Repub-
licans now wanted an independent counsel to investigate the "subject
matter" of 1996 campaign finance practices, even though that addi-
tional language had been expressly rejected by Congress just three
years before.4' Republicans bitterly criticized Attorney General Janet
Reno for refusing to order an investigation, again, despite the fact
that the words of the statute did not permit her to do so absent the
broadened language.
The impact of the emphasis on appearances versus reality was
also evident. Congressional Republicans argued that an independent
counsel could be appointed if there was merely an appearance of a
35. 28 U.S.C. § 591(c) (1994).
36. See supra note 34.
37. See H.R_ CoNF. REP. No. 103-511, at 10 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 792,
793 (discussing why Congress rejected the Justice Department's proposal).
38. Id. (explaining that the "subject matter" language was deleted "because it would in
effect substantially lower the threshold for use of the general discretionary provision").
39. Id. (explaining that "[t]he conference agreement ma[de] no change from the 1987
law in the substantive reach or scope of the general discretionary provision"); see also infra
note 41 (noting the scope of the attorney general's discretion under the independent
counsel statute).
40. See Ceci Connolly, Hatch Repeats Call for Finance Counsel; Reno Criticized on Lack of
Outside Probe, WASH. POST, July 27, 1998, at A6; Michael Grunwald, Reno Unmoved in Senate
Grilling; GOP Critics Revisit Campaign Finance Probe, Urge Independent Counse WASH. POST,
July 16, 1998, at A7; Edward Walsh, GOP Senators Press Harderfor Independent Counsel, WASH.
POST, Oct. 23, 1997, at A18; House Republicans' Call for Independent Counsel Rejected, WASH.
POST, Oct. 4, 1997, at A6.
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conflict of interest, rather than the actual conflict required by the stat-
ute, despite the fact that Congress had rejected the broadening of the
Act to include an "appearances" standard."a By the Republicans' "ap-
pearances" standard, there would arguably have to be an independent
counsel appointed any time there were credible allegations of political
wrongdoing, since there could be an appearance of a conflict of inter-
est any time a Democratic Attorney General investigates a Republican
campaign or a Democratic one. Now it was the Republicans, with
short memories regarding their rhetoric during the Iran-Contra days,
who were more than willing to use the Act as a partisan instrument for
criminalizing political differences.
The point simply is this: neither Democrats nor Republicans are
pure on this issue. At the first sign of a possible "scandal" allegation,
congressional leaders from both parties have been too quick to refer
matters to the criminal justice system that used to be left to the tradi-
tional give-and-take of the political marketplace. The effect has been
the evisceration of the role of a politically accountable Justice Depart-
ment. As the Kenneth Starr regime demonstrated, an independent
counsel can run amock when there are no limits on budget or time,
and in practical terms, can operate with virtual impunity while engi-
neering a shift from investigating a fifteen-year-old land deal to inves-
tigating the private sexual life of a sitting president. The consequence
of this misuse of the Independent Counsel Act was the further fueling
of the scandal machine and the further undermining of the people's
confidence both in their government and in the effective functioning
of American democracy.
Fortunately, in 1999, Congress, on a bipartisan basis, recognized
the dangers of the independent counsel and refused to renew the
Act.42 An important source of fuel for the scandal machine has hope-
fully been eliminated. Yet the danger remains. Under regulations
published soon after the expiration of the Act, the attorney general
may appoint a "special prosecutor" whenever the "public interest" (in
whose eyes?) requires it.4" Thus, an even broader standard is now
available for politicians and members of the ethics apparat to exploit.
41. Prior to 1994, the Independent Counsel Act gave "the Attorney General [the] dis-
cretionary authority to use the independent counsel process for any person whose investi-
gation or prosecution by the Department of Justice 'may result in a personal, financial or
political conflict of interest.'" H.R. CONE. REP. No. 103-511, at 10. In 1994, Congress ex-
plicidy rejected extending the Act to include "perceived as well as actual conflicts of inter-
est." Id.
42. See supra note 27.
43. 28 C.F.RI § 600.1 (2000).
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Can they be expected to resist the temptation to abuse and misuse it?
I doubt it.
E. Public and Press Cynicism
Providing the emotional lifeblood for each of these elements of
the scandal machine is a pervasive public cynicism towards politics
and politicians that is obviously shared by large segments of the work-
ing press, editorial writers, columnists, and pundits. This is a cynicism
that is arguably deeper and more pervasive than in previous periods of
American history when political scandals dominated the news. The
attitude is surely traceable to the cumulative effect of Vietnam, the
violence and counterculture of the 1960s, and, most importantly,
Watergate. At its core-as demonstrated above in the description of
the scandal machine's treatment of the allegations of Democratic
campaign finance abuses-is the general acceptance of the proposi-
tion that repeated publication or broadcast of allegations of wrongdo-
ing against public officials are themselves evidence of wrongdoing.
My best example of this conclusion is a column written in early
1996 by William Safire, the well-known columnist for the New York
Times. The headline of the column called the First Lady, Hillary
Rodham Clinton, a "congenital liar.""4 Saire cited examples of alleg-
edly untrue statements Mrs. Clinton had made about Whitewater, the
travel office episode, and related matters.45 The pattern of these un-
truths, according to Saire, justified the expression, "congenital liar."
After a week of investigating the facts, documentation, and news
reporting concerning every one of Safire's examples, I discovered that
all of them were either untrue, half-true, or unsubstantiated by evi-
dence. Ten times zero is still zero. Ten unsupported accusations
equal ten unsupported accusations, and that is all.
Unfortunately, I came to realize that many in the press corps and
large numbers of citizens accepted Safire's mathematics and not
mine; ten unsupported accusations, they believed, even without any
evidence, constituted a lot of smoke, and "where's there's smoke,
there's fire."
In the 1990s, the Clintons were the targets. But in the 1980s, it
was the Republicans in the executive branch who bore the brunt of
the machine's venom and its presumption of guilt. Take, for exam-
ple, the story of Raymond Donovan, President Reagan's Secretary of
Labor. At Donovan's confirmation hearings in early 1981, after being
44. William Saire, Blizzard of Lies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996, at A27.
45. Id.
[VOL. 60:41
THE SCANDAL MACHINE
nominated by President Reagan to serve as Secretary of Labor, he was
connected to possible links with organized crime.46 The hearings
never proved such links; they never even provided direct evidence of
them, but rather, the mere suspicion of them.47 Charges of corrup-
tion and kickbacks concerning Donovan's New Jersey construction
company also appeared, but only with the support of innuendo and
never any direct evidence. Finally, after an accumulation of newspa-
per leaks and anonymously sourced stories, President Reagan's Attor-
ney General, Edwin Meese, appointed an independent counsel, Leon
Silverman.48 Between 1982 and 1987, Silverman opened and closed
down two separate independent counsel investigations.49 Each time
he closed an investigation, he did so with a conditional comment that
there was no persuasive evidence of a crime.5° Each time, Donovan
was left to try to continue his professional and personal life with a
cloud hanging over his head.
Donovan was indicted in the Bronx by Democratic District Attor-
ney Mario Merola,51 and was finally forced to resign as Secretary of
Labor.5 2 He was tried and acquitted.53 On the courthouse steps,
when he was congratulated by a member of the press corps for his
acquittal, Mr. Donovan was quoted as saying, in what is now a famous
and sad commentary on the presumption-of-guilt, McCarthyite scan-
46. E.g., George Lardner Jr., Democrats Cite New Anti-Donovan Charges, WASH. POST, Feb.
1, 1981, at A10; Democrats Report New Allegations Against Donovan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1981, at
A25; Philip Shabecoff, Senators Question Donovan on Jersey Racketeering, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
1981, at B6.
47. See, e.g., Michael Oreskes, No Evidence Found to Back Charges Against Donovan, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1982, at Al; Philip Shabecoff, FB.L Says It Can't Confirm Alegations on Dono-
van, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1981, at Al. Based on this lack of evidence, the Senate confirmed
Donovan over the objection of many Democrats. Philip Shabecoff, Senate Approves Dono-
van, Rejecting Bribe Allegations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1981, at A17.
48. The attacks on Donovan were so harsh that Donovan himself asked that an inde-
pendent counsel be appointed to investigate the alleged wrongdoing. Seth S. King, Dono-
van Calls for Special Prosecutor on His Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1981, at Al.
49. James Schwartz, Independent Counsels: A Short History, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1988, at
A8.
50. See Ralph Blumenthal, Inquiry on Donovan Again Yields 'Insufficient Evidence' to Prose-
cute, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1982, at Al ("A special Federal prosecutor yesterday announced
for the second time that he had found no prosecutable evidence of organized-crime con-
nections involving Labor Secretary Raymond J. Donovan.").
51. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Donovan Indicted and Given a Leave to Defend Himself, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 1984, at Al.
52. Kenneth B. Noble, Donovan Resigns Labor Dept. Post; Must Stand Tria4 N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 1985, at Al.
53. Selwyn Raab, Donovan Cleared of Fraud Charges by Jury in Bronx, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
1987, at Al.
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dal machine we have all created: "'Which office do I go to to get my
reputation back?"' 4
The cynicism that led so many people-including yours truly-to
assume that Raymond Donovan was a crook who should be ousted
occurs among both Democrats and Republicans. And its victims are
both Democrats and Republicans. The scandal machine is systemic.
It is not about one particular party being more partisan or more will-
ing to misuse congressional investigations than the other. It is not
about an ideological press that is "out to get" one political party or the
other. We are talking about a process deeply imbedded within the
body politic in which journalists, politicians, legal institutions, and
public attitudes combine to produce rot-horrible rot.
It has nothing to do with party or ideology.
There are no clean hands here. Certainly not mine.
It's time to say to the scandal machine-Democrats and Republi-
cans together-enough. The politics of personal descruction must
end.
54. Id, (quoting Raymond Donovan).
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